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I. 
NATURE OF CASE 
The Pl~intiff-Respond~nt, M~rk Robert Gilleland in ~ cicil action 
seeks to recover a judgment from the defend~nts for willful br~ch of 
- - . -
- - -
contract and deliberate scuddling of a corporation to avoid payryent 
-
of said contract. 
II. 
DISPOSITION IN IfWER COURT 
This district Court of Weber County granted to the Plaintiff a 
- - - -
default judgnent against the defendants on August 29, 1979, after 
- - -
both defendants failed to file responsive pleadings in tirre as allowed 
by law. 
- - - -
That after said default judgment was entered, nothing occured tmtil 
- -
the defendant, George Jacobs, was served with a Supplirrental Order on 
- - . -
October, 15, 1979, after which on October 16, 1979, 49 days after judgrrent 
- -
was entered, a Motion to Vacate was made. 
- - .. - -
On October 29, Defendant-Appellant's.Motion to Vacate was argued and 
on N~ember 20, 1979, in a written opinion said rrotion w~s denied. 
On december 4, 1979, a Motion for a Rehearing was made and argues on 
- - -
December 31, 1979. On January 8, 1980, said nrition was again denied in a 
written opinion. 
·III. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiff-Respond.ant respectfully seeks that the lower court be 
-
upheld and Defendant, George Jacobs' appeal be denied, with costs to the 
-
Plaintiff-Appellant. 
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IV. 
STATEMENI' OF FACTS 
- - - - -
That on March 12, · 1979·, Plaintiff-Respondants attorney addressed 
-
a letter to Mr. George Jacobs, President of Sandwich World, Inc., sole 
owner of the same ~king a d~nd· on s~id corpor~tion for the b~iance d~e 
and owing the Plaintiff on a written contract entered into on the 2nd 
day of September 1977. 
'Ihat on March 22, 1979, a letter signed by George Jacobs, as Pres-
ident of Sandwich World, Inc., w~s sent to and recei~ed by Plaintiff-
Respondant' s attorney, wherein it indicated that Sandwich World w~s 
- . -
denying the requests and allegations contained in the previous .letter. 
- -
On April 11, 1979, the State of Utah served Garnishment Interrog-
- - -
atories on Sandwich World_, Inc., and the said George Jacobs signed under 
- - - - -
oath an acknowledgrrent that Sandwich World did in fact owe Mr. Gilleland 
-
substantial SlllTIS of rroney. 
- - -
On approximately May 1, 1979, Plaintiff-Respondant's attorney per-
- -
sonally telephoned Mr. George Jacobs and advised him of the claim and 
the inconsist~t positions of his letter d~ted.March 22, 1979, and his 
-
sworn statenent dated April 11, 1979, at which t:ine he becaire extreirely 
hostile and stated as follows: 
''If Mr. Gilleland or you attempt to collect this rroney, I will person 
- -
~lly see that it is not collected by sinking corporation so that nobody 
will get anything." 
On May 15, 1979, the Plaintiff, by and through his attorney, Dmell 
G. Renstrom, filed suit against Sandwich World, Inc. 
-
On "May 28, 1979 Sandwich World, Inc., was served. 
-2-
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-On June 27, 1979, an Amended Complaint was filed by the Pl~intiff, 
suing both Sandwich World, Inc. , and George J~cobs, ~s an indi vid~l. 
On July 3, 1979, the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office ~de ~ 
return of service indicating that the Defencfunts could not be se~d 
bec~use they h~d mo.;ed out ~nd left no fo~rding address. 
. -
On August 7, 1979, both the Defendant, Sandwich World, Inc., and 
- . - -
George Jacobs were served by the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office. 
- -
, On August 27, 1979, the time within which to answer said Complaint 
expired. 
- - - -
On August 29, 1979, the Plaintiff took a default judgrent against 
both Defendants. 
-
On August 29, 1979, Plaintiff-Respondant.::upon retuni.ingtto: l:iis(of:fice 
- - - - -
after taking a default judgnent, had ~ note indicating that ~ Richard 
- - - - - - -
J. Lawrence of Salt Lake City had called him, and an attempt was made by 
- - -
Plaintiff-Respondant' s attorney to return the call. However, Mr. Lawrence 
. - -
was not available to take the call. 
- - - -
On approximately September 4, 1979, Plaintiff-Respondant's Attorney 
- - - - - -
received a call from attorney Richard J .. Lawrence indicating that he repre-
- .. - - -
sented the Defendant, George Jacobs and wanted additional time in which to 
- . - - - -· -
answer said<Cornplaint. At this tine, he was advised that a default had al-
.. - . -
ready been taken and while Plaintiff-Respondant's attorney would like to 
accornnodate him, he could not do so because of the misrepresentations and 
o.bstreperous conduct of his client. 
- -· - -
On October 16, 1979, some 49 days after the default was taken, counsel 
for the Defendant, George Jacobs, sought to have the judgment vacated. 
-
-
The District Court.· made the following Findings of Fact and reached -
- - -
the following Conclusions of Law in the said matter on the 20th day of 
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November 1979, in response to a M:>tion to Vacate the Judgment by the 
Defendant-Appellant: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The file discloses that on May 17th, 1979, plaintiff 
filed a complaint aganist the defendant Sandwich World, Inc., 
but not Jacobs as an individual. 
2. This complaint was served on the 18th day of May, 1979, 
on Sandwich World, Inc., by leaving it with George Jacobs, Pres-
ident. 
3. On June 28, 1979, plaintiff filed an amended can-
, plaint that sued both Sandwich World, Inc., and George Jacobs 
as an individual. This surrmons was served on the 7th day of 
August, 1979, and did recite that it was served together 
with a copy of· the complaint. However, there is no issue that 
what was actually served was the Amended Canplaint, by the 
Sheriff of Salt Lake County. All of these instruments were duly 
filed with the Court. 
4. On August 29, 1979 the plaintiff moved for and was 
granted a default judgment for failure of defendants to answer 
or submit evidence. The actual judgnent per se was signed by 
the Court on August 29, 1979, but findings of fact were not for-
mally submitted at that tine; but the Judgment was submitted and 
signed. Plaintiff's attorney was infonned that eventually 
findings of fact would have to be submitted. 
5. Nothing further appears of record until October 11, 1979, 
when the Court received a copy of a Motion to Vacate the Judg-
ment and Dismiss Complaint. This was accompanied by a menoraridt.nn 
in support of it. The certificate of mailing indicates that it 
was mailed on the 10th day of October, and presumably would be 
received approximately when the original was received by the 
Court on October 11th. 
6. There was enclosed an ~ffidavit of Mr. Jacobs, in 
which he alleges that he was too busy to contact an attorney 
until near the last date, and that when he contacted an attorney, 
the attorney infonned him he was not prepared to have a confer-
ence at that time, and would request a continuance. 
7. There is an affidavit from the attorney, indicating that 
he did receive that contact from his client when there was 
still approximately two days to go on the ti:rre allowed for 
answer to the Amended Complaint. 'Ille attorney's affidavit 
also alleges that he make a phone call to Darrell Renstrom's 
office, the plaintiff's attorney; but did not reach Darrell 
Renstrom in any way or contact him by phone. 
8. Darrell Renstrom indicated that he attempted to return 
the call to the attorney for defendant, but did not know what 
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9. On the afternoon after the default had been heard ~here· was~ tel~phone convers~tion bewteen· the two attorneys 
involved, in which.defet?-dants att~rney requested plaintiff's 
attorney to set aside his default Jud~nt. Plaintiff's 
attorney refused to do so, on the basis that he had been 
infonned by the ~efe~dan~ personally that he (the defendant) 
would do everything in his power to stall and make it im-
possible for the plaintiff ever to co.Hect anything. 
10. There was no 100tion made for a new trial within the 
statutory period. 
11. There was no effort made toward an appeal in any fonn 
during the statutory period. 
12. On October 11, 1979, the Court received and filed the 
, Motion to dismiss the complaint, and also for the setting aside 
of the default so that the matter could proceed upon it merits. 
TheCourLnotes that this action may well have been pranpted 
by the filing of supplerrentary proceedin~s, signed on October 
4, 1979, by Judge Calvin Gould of this District. This supple-
mental proceeding had been served on the 10th day of October 
1979, which would be the day before the Motion to Set Aside 
the Judgment was filed. 
13. There has been a hearing on the supplerrental order. At 
this hearing, the motion to set .aside the default was heard, 
and also the motion to dismiss for lack of ~jurisdiction was 
heard. Plaintiff's attorney has submitted a later affidavit, 
but the Court deeins it is intnaterial. 
14. Insofar as it is material to these motions, the de-
fendant's testinvny under oath in the supplementary proceedin$s 
is as follows: Defendant testified that at the tine in question 
he was a resident of the State of Utah, and was conducting 
this business within the State of Utah, that is, Sandwich World, 
Inc. He also testified that he was the president of the corpor-
ation, the only stockholder with the exception of his wife, and 
the only lmown official with the exception of his wife, and that 
there were never any stockholders' rreetings as such, but just 
conferences between him and his wife,. He testified that he had 
been ordered to bring with him the records of Sandwich World, Inc,. 
so that they could be explored at this hearing, but indicated 
that he did not know for sure where the records were, but 
thought that he possibly could find them, but had not made any 
real serious effort to do so, except maybe to inquire of one 
person if he had the records, and that person indicated he "would 
look." He also indicated the records may well be with some 
accountant who had not been paid, and that he had made absolutely 
no contact with the accountant in any way. The defendant 
Jacobs also testified that he had been a resident throughout all 
of the proceedings, and that he did send the correspondence which 
introduced into evidence, in the fonn of letters 
15. The defendant Jacobs further testified that he may have 
totally abandoned all of the records, and that he left them with 
-C\-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
another person so that person could possibly get sorre money out 
of the corporation, but he is not sure that this is . true. He . 
did not brin~ the bankbooks, and claims that they are at a place 
unknown to hun. 
16. The Court finds it to be a fact that the defendant has 
made absolutely no effort to appear at the supplenental proceed-
ings in an informed position at all. Defendant's testimony d<:les 
not disclose where he was, or why he was out of town, or why it 
was that he could not contact an attorney earlier than he did. 
He has testified that he is now employed as a salesman, earning 
about $500.00 a week, but does not give any details or in any 
way specify why he cannot or did not take care of the supplenental 
proceeding or the complaint before. 
17. 'Ih~re is no justificati?U in record.at al~ fo~ ~y ~here 
was no moition made for a new trial .. There is no Just1ficat1on 
in the record at all for why there was not an appeal filed, if 
defendant felt that the judgnent which had3been rendered was imprope 
18. The Court did re.quire formal findings of fact to be pre-
pared even though this had been a default matter! and thc:t if 
there was any appeal they could be seen. There is no evidence 
or justification in the record at all as to why the rrotion to set 
aside the judgnent was not filed earlier, except that these may 
have been just continuous delays until the supplen:ental proceeding 
was filed. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The rrotion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is denied. 
It appears from all the evidence before the Court that defendant 
was in fact a resident of the State of Utah at the time of service 
of sumnons and the Amended Complaint upon him, .. and~.that_ne was 
responsible to the jurisdiction of the court. Whether or not the 
motion might have been made at that time to change the venue is 
irrmaterial at this tine, and the Court has not explored as to 
whether or not the plaintiff had a justification for holding it 
. in Weber County. But the. rrere fact that there may or may not have 
been grounds for change of venue does not deprive the Court of 
jurisdiction in any way. 
2. The Court finds that there is no excusable neglect on the 
part of the defendant in preparing for either the supplenentary 
proceedings which has taken place before the Court, or any justi':" 
f~cation for failing t<:> answer to. the complaint within~a reasonabl~. 
~1111e, or to.~ke a mc;tion for a·new trial, or to file an appeal,~. 
in the specified peri.od. The Court concludes that there is a defm 
program designed to stall collection efforts, and that this is in f 
the defendant Jacobs' goal, ·and in fact proved by circt.nnStantial 
evidence beyond any reasonable doubt to be his intent. The service 
of stmnxms made .by the Sheriff with the Arrended Complaint did 
recite "the attached complain," whereas actually what was attached 
was a doclllllent called the "Amended Canplaint;" however, there is no 
evidence that the defendant was c:"~~ =~-~'··he,·~- ~ of 
slight irregularity. . 
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3. The Court denies the motion to dismiss for lack of Jur-
isdiction. 
-4. The Court denies the trotion to set aside the.default. 
5. The Court-denies the trotion to set aside the default judgment. 
Th~t the Distri~t eourt ~de the~·additional Findings.--oLFact -cmd 
readched the following Conclusions of ~on J~nu~ry 8, 1980, .in 
- - -
denying the Defendant-Appellant's motion for a rehearing to vacate 
said judgnent as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. There is no suggestion in any of the affidavits or evidence 
that the corporation defendant has any defense against plaintiff's 
cause of action praying for the return of the tlDileys. 
- -
2. The affidavits, evidence, and arguments of the attorneys 
suggest only one defense on behalf of the individual defendant. That 
defense_is that the defendant acted only as an agent for the corpor-
ation,_ and is _not individually liable,, and further, that the defendant 
has taken no action that would justify the setting aside of .the 
corporation shield. 
- - -
3. _Before this lawsuit was filed, plaintiff's attorney contacted 
the individual defendant and inforttEd him of an intent to sue if the 
rroneys were not returned. .The individual defendant infonned 
plaintiff's attorney that if such a suit were filed, the individual 
defendant would see to it that the lawsuit was frustrated, and that 
no recovery would be had. 
- - -
4. The plaintiff's attorney indicated an intent to go forward 
with the lawsuit without any further delay. 
. 5. The plaintiff's attorney then filed the lawsuit on behalf 
of his client, and has at no time ever consented to any type of 
delay. 
- - . - -
6... The individual defendant does in fact have an intent to _ 
frustrate the plaintiff's efforts to bring __ the matter to an imnediate 
conclusion. He has acted in pursuit of that intent throughout this 
proceeding. 
7. After the pl~intiff's ~ction was filed, but before expiration 
of the 20-day ~riod, the_defendants' attorney did call plaintiff's 
attorney's office and leave.a rressage for plaintiff's attorney to 
return the call to him in .Salt Lake _City. There was no infonnation 
given that reached the plaintiff's attorney indicating why.th~ _ . 
attorney wished the return call, or even who the attorney indicating 
-7-
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why the attorney wished the return can, or even who the attorney I 
represented. The plaintiff's attorney offices in Ogden, Utah, and he 
_placed the return call "collect" to the defense attorney. The defe 
attorney refused _the call. There was no further contact between the 
attorneys until after the default was taken. -· On the day the plainfi 
attorney appeared in court and took default against both defendants 
and had returned_to his office, the defense attorney telephoned ' 
the plaintiff's attorney to request a delay. _ Plaintiffs' attorney ' 
imrrediately infonned the defense attorney that the default.had 
been entered, _and that he wc:ul~ not cooperate. in. any .way _wi~h setting 
aside the default. The plaintiff's attorney 1nd1cat1ed an intent 
to go forward with his judgment. 
_8. The defense did not .file any notion under the provisions. 
for a new trial. The defense took no action at all until there was 
, ·served a "supplemental proceeding" on .the individual defendant to 
advance collection on the judgment against both the corporation and 
himself. 
- -
9. Imnediately on the time for _the scheduled supplemental pro 
ing, the individual defendant filed a notion to delay .the supplerenta 
proceeding, and a further motion to set aside the default on the gr 
of excusable neglect. 
-
10. The Court ordered the supplenental proceeding to _go forward, 
but _took under advisement the motion to _set aside the default, as the 
default concerned the individual defendant. There has never been 
filed, to _the Court's knowledge, a motion to set aside this default 
judgment as it affects the corporate defendant. 
-
11. 1broughout the supplemental proceedings, there has been deba 
and evidence received, in support of the respective contentions of 
side on the motion to set aside the default judgment a$ainst the 
individual defendant. The Court makes the following findings of 
fact growing out of those hearings: 
- -
A. The defendant intended to file an _answer setting forth the 
defense that he acted only as an agent of the_corporation 
and further, that there was · no reason to rerrove the agent's 
corporation shield. 
- -
B. This was the defendant's intention when he received the 
anplaint, and his intention when he first contacted his 
attorney, and·remains his intention. 
C. An ~s~r _could h~;e been _filed in a tirrely _f~shion in this 
lawsuit, after no nore .than 30 minutes preparation time. 
- -
D. The answer was not filed within the 20 days allowed. 
- -
E. There was an effort made by the defendant '_s attorney _to ca 
it to_appear that there was sane justification for failure 
file a t:inely answer, ~hreas none in fact exists. 
- - ... 4 • 
F. The individual defendant's actions throughout the suppl~ 
_proceedings have been de ·, ;:'.1tiff's 
efforts to collect the --:ion 
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- -
defendant and _against _the individual defendant himself. ·-
This. action ~s been a refusal t? bring to court in a timely 
fashion materials subpoenaed, _failure_to answer questions 
that would_nonnally be answerable by an infonred corporation 
official, and a failure to t:i.nely disclose where such records 
were kept. 
- 12. The Court c~n find no concincing evidence in this case of 
any excusable neglect. 
. -
13. The Court finds in this case a deliberate intent to_cause 
"muddy water" to appear so that the proceedings would be delayed 
beyond the time set forth under the rules and statutes. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAM 
-------
- .. - -
1. The default judg;nent was entered on proper evidence, after 
the time to answer had expired. 
- -
2. There was no excusable neglect. 
- 4 - - - -
3. The failure to answer was deliberate, in an attempt to frustrate 
the proceedings. 
_ 4. There is no equitable reason why this judgment should be set 
aside under the circtnnStances here present. 
5. The Court denies all 100tions to set aside the default judgnent. 
v 
RESPONSE 
- - - . 
While the Courts of this state do not favor Judgments or default, 
- -
neither do they favor inexcusable neglect on the part of a litigant to 
. -
file timely pleadings nor do they favor the Courts being used for .a 
del~ying t~ctic to a~oid honest obligations. 
- . 
In Downey State Bank v Major Blackeney Corporation 545 Pacific 2nd. 
507 the Court ·said the following: 
"The party who seeks to have a default jud~nt set aside, 
·rrust proffer some defense of .at least sufficient · 
astensible merit to justify Ct: trial on that issue." 
Also in the c~se of Weating house Electrical Supply Co v Paul 
W. ~rsen Contractor Inc., 544 Pacific 2nd 876 the court said: 
''Where any re~sonable excuse is offered by def~ulting 
~~==;;:;;;;;;;,;;;; ......... iiiiii-~r, Courts generally tend to favor granting reluf 
-:~-=------~TirlC'~-~ciefault judfment, unless to do so would result 
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- - -
· in substantial prejudice to the adverse party" 
~ -
In the present case the defendant after being served with a s 
and compl~int did nothing untill nearly two-thirds of his 20-day 
period h~d expired, (no excuse offered.) He then after 13 days 
took it to his attorney who did nothing· until! two days after the 
expi~~tion of the 20-~y period ~d that was only an ~ttempt to 
re~ch plaintiff-Respondants attorney by telephone. 
. . - - -
About September 4, 1979, six days later, Defendants-Appellant's 
Attorney did reach plainfiff-Respondantsattomey by telephone to 
- - - -
request additional time, but was inforned that the default had been 
- - -
taken on August 29, 1979, two days after the normal 20-day period. 
- . -
Defendant-Appellant's attorney again does nothing until 49 days 
-
later and only after his client has been served with Supplerrental 
Proceedings. 
- - -
Counsel for Dependant-appellant claims he had called opposing 
. - - . 
counsel several ti.nEs· and left several messages. This is denied, 
- - - -
however, when plaintiff-Respondents' attorney did return a call on 
- - -
August 29, 1979, he did it at his own expense and the call was not 
- . - - -
accepted. as M'r. Lawrence was too busy to take the call . Mr. 
-
Lawrence offers the excuse that he was trying to reach Mr. Renstran 
. - -
to obtain an extension of ti1:n=, but what excuse is offered for the 
49 d~ys which expired ~fter the jud~nt w~s entered. He offers 
nothing. His ~rgument th~t opposing counsel's secretary may ha~e 
·- -
not relayed nessages accurately1 is supposition on his part and 
it could just as easily be argued because of the e~ident neglect, 
- -
no such calls were ever made until Augl.ist 29, 1979, after default 
judgment had been entered. 
-
This Court held in Cutler v Haycock 32 U. 354, 90.P. 897 the 
following. : 
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"Generally, courts were inclined-to grant 
relief from.default and ~ring about judg-
ment on ..men.ts, unless default- was result of 
inexcusable neglect of _patty in default, 
or it would be inequitable to set it aside." 
The definition of excusable neglect is well st~ted in Cross~ 
- -
v. Irrigation Dev. Corp., Wyo., 598P. 2d 812, as follows: 
- - - -- - -
"Excusable neglect, as basis for late_appeal, 
is measured on a strict standard to take care 
of genuine emergency conditions, such as death, 
sickness, undue delay in the mails and other 
situations where such behavior might be the act 
of a reasonably prudent person under the cir-
cumstances. Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
rule 2. 01." 
- -
Also, Holton v. Holton, 121 Utah 451, 243 P. 2d 43~ and Nunley 
v. Stan ~tz Real Est~te, Inc., 15 Utcfu 2d 126: 
-
''Although the New Rules of_ Civil Procedure 
were intended to provide liberality in _ 
procedure, it is nevertheless expected that 
they will be followed, and _unless _reasons . 
satisfactory to the court are advanced as 
a basis for relief from_ canplying with them, 
parties will not be excused fran so doing." 
- - - - -
No excusable neglect is advanced by the Defendant-appellant other 
~ - - - -
than , "we didn~t.::get around to it on tirreand assUl:red we cou!d.::get 
. - - -
an:extenaion", and this is not consistent with the standard set in 
the for going case. 
- - - - - --
Even after judgment by default the Defendant-appellant could have 
- - -
. -
sought a new trial within the ten day rule. That dead line was 
- - -
ignored. He could have appealed. He chose to ignore that. 
- - -
'llle earliest holdings of this Court have given the trial Courts 
sound discretion as ruled in Noui:man v. Topance 1 U. 168 
''While gr~nting or refusing applications to 
open and set aside defaults was addressed to 
Court's sound discretion, that p,ower was to be 
exercised freely and liberally.' 
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- -
This court further said: in the previously cited Cutler v. 
- -
Haycock case the following: 
-
"Discretion of trial court in vacating default 
judgment ~as to be applied t? facts ~s they . 
appeared irt each _case, and, in exercise of tins .. 
discretion, aim and object should be prorootion and 
futherance of justice and protection of rights 
of all concerned." 
~d further held in Aaron v. Hol~s the following 35 U. 49. 99 P 450 
'"1hether default_and judgment should be set aside, 
and party_aggrieved given opportunity to plead to 
rrerits, was_within sound discretion of trial court; 
unless it was made to appear that discretion had 
been abused, rulings of trial court would not be 
disturbed on appeal.'.' 
- . 
The question is, has the Court abused· its discretion in the pres 
c~se? A Reading of the transcript of the SupplerrEntal Hearings 
the following: (See Transcript on File herein.) 
- -
A. The Defendant-appellant was president of Sandwich World Inc,. 
(Page 3 line 2) 
"" - -
B. That Defendant-appellant abandoned the corporation. (page 
3 lines 5-10) 
. - -
C. The corporation did not take out Bankruptcy. (page 3 lines 1 
- - - - - -
D. No effort was made _by the Defendant-appellant to dissolve 
the corporation. (page 3 lines 24 thru 26) 
- - .. -
E. The Defendant-appellant gave no location as to where he cou 
be found after a letter of abandonement was sent. (page 4 
lines 13 thru 30 and page 5 1 thru 13. ) 
- -
F. The Defendant-appellant was the sole and only owner of 
sc:indwich World. (page 5 lines 24 thru 30 and page 6 
lines 1 and 2.) 
- -
G. That the Defendant-appellant did not know or care where 
corporate records were and defied the order of the Court 
to produce them. (pages 6,7,8 and 9.) 
- - - -
H. That the Defendant-appellant paid himself a large salary. 
(page 13 lines 3 thru 18 .) 
- - . 
I. That the Defendant--appellant made in consistent statarents 
under oath. (page 14 lines 19 thru 30 page 15 1 thru 8.) 
-12-
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- J. - The Bank account of the Corporation was avail~ble to Defend~t­
appellant 's wife. (page 16 lines 4 thru 6.) 
K~ The J?efendant-appellant could not even. identify who the 
corp01ate officers were even though he was president. (page 17 line 
3thru 30.) 
- - -
- - -
L. The Defendant-appellant was the corporate al~.r ego. (page 
18 lines 10 thru 22.) 
- - - -
_ M... Defendant-appellant's wife made draws on the Corporation 
Bank account. (page 19 lines 21 thru 29.) · · 
It is clear from the record th~t the Defend~t-~ppell~t had 
, every intent to use the corporation for his own purposes ~nd ~bandon 
the same when expedient. 
CONCLUSION 
- - -
The trial Court had the advantage of observing the Defendant-
- - - - .. -
appellant tmder oath at the time of the Supplemental Hearing and 
- - - -
could only conclude as it did that the Dependant-appellant was using 
- - -
the Courts as an effort to buy time against the legitimate claim of 
- - - - -
the plaintiff-Respondant·and had in fact abused the authority he had 
- - - -
as corporate president and sole owner of the same and deliberately 
- - - -
allowed the Corporation to fold after he drained all the assetes 
-
from the same. 
Th~t Defendant-~ppell~t m:ide no showing of excusable neglect for 
failing to file his pleadings nor has his attorney. 
Th~t Defend~nt-~ppell~t ~d his ~ttorney knowing full well that 
time w~s of the essence ~de no effort to file any p~per~ with the 
- - - -· 
Court until the same was served with a Supplemental order. 
Th~t m~t they failed to do with the tri~l Court, they h~ve 
- -
succeeded in doing with this appeal as spurious as it is. 
_1 'l_ 
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Wherefore it is respectfully urged that the District Court 
be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted this 29th d y 
aet 
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